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Chinese Responses to Disaster: A View From the Qing
May 19, 2008 in China Behind the Headline by The China Beat | 2 comments

By Kathryn Edgerton-Tarpley
Media reports of this week’s devastating earthquake in Sichuan highlight trends seen as impressive
and new in terms of PRC responses to disaster. The quick response of state leaders symbolized by
Premier Wen Jiabao’s much-heralded arrival in the disaster area only five hours after the earthquake
hit on Monday, for instance, stands in stark contrast to the PRC’s handling of major catastrophes
during the Mao-era, when Chairman Mao and other top leaders failed to act on reports that people
were starving to death by the thousands during the Great Leap Famine of 1959-61. An estimated 30
million people died as a result of that famine, making it the most lethal famine in world history.
The willingness of the Chinese government to accept international aid, and most recently even rescue
teams from Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore, provides an equally sharp contrast to the
Mao-era government’s determination to keep news of the Great Leap Famine a secret, even if that
required increasing grain exports to neighboring countries during the disaster rather than requesting
foreign aid. The rapidity of the response and the massive scale of the government-led relief effort—
100 rescue helicopters dropping soldiers into remote areas and 130,000 soldiers and medics mobilized
for relief work within three days of the earthquake—may be new for Americans as well, particularly for
those who recall how victims of Hurricane Katrina waited for a full week before 50,000 members of the
U.S. National Guard were finally dispatched to the disaster area.
While helicopter drops and the acceptance of Japanese rescue teams are new for China, other facets
of this week’s earthquake relief effort display interesting similarities to relief campaigns carried out in
late imperial China. As a historian of famines in nineteenth-century China, I was intrigued to read that
just as the rulers of China’s last dynasty, the Qing (1644-1911), sought to shore up social stability
during disasters by seeking to regulate grain prices in famine areas, on Thursday (5/15) China’s
current government imposed temporary controls on food prices and transportation fares in the quakehit areas of Sichuan, Gansu, and Shaanxi in an attempt to stop hoarding and speculation. Officials
even punished seventeen people for profiteering.
Some American media reports (most recently a front-page LA Times article from May 17th) take the
PRC’s proactive response as evidence that the government is at last beginning to govern “in a manner
befitting a modern 21st century state.” A broader historical perspective, however, suggests that in fact
the current PRC government is acting in the tradition of imperial China’s Confucian rulers, who often
acted with alacrity during natural disasters, both out of a sense of responsibility to nourish the people
and a mindfulness that failing to do so might cost them Heaven’s mandate and popular sanction for
their rule.
This week China’s state-run media also reported that quake victims can depend on the government to
pay their medical expenses. In late imperial China, officials and local literati argued that disasters
were a result of the interaction of natural and human forces. While Heaven might send the original
drought that led to a crop failure, for instance, it was believed to be a combination of people’s failure
to prepare for disaster beforehand and the selfish and greedy behavior of low-level officials and
underlings that allowed a drought to escalate into a major famine. The earthquake in Sichuan is
obviously a natural rather than man-made catastrophe. Nevertheless, PRC officials seem as anxious as
their late-Qing counterparts to ensure that what starts as a natural disaster is not transformed into
something even worse on their watch. As Deputy Health Minister Gao Qiang explained when taking
responsibility for preventing the outbreak of large-scale epidemics in quake areas, “We should not add
to the losses caused by natural disasters and let people suffer more just because we have not done
our job well.” (China Daily, 5/16).
The involvement of large numbers of private citizens provides another parallel between late-Qing
famine relief efforts and the current relief campaign. During the North China Famine that killed
roughly 13 million people during the late 1870s, wealthy philanthropists from cities throughout the
Jiangnan region (the lower Yangzi) worked together to raise relief money for their starving
compatriots in North China. Some enterprising southern literati even traveled to the northern

provinces themselves to distribute grain, bury bodies, build schools for famine orphanages, and
redeem women who had been sold by their starving families. While some of these men later received
state recognition for their relief work, their relief activities were separate from the Qing state’s official
relief campaign.
Media coverage of the current disaster has highlighted the Chinese government’s response and the
PLA’s crucial role in relief work. A few reports, however, show that private citizens are responding to
the disaster in impressive numbers as well. The People’s Daily reported that by Wednesday Beijingers
had filled the city’s blood bank, so hundreds of additional would-be donors were asked to leave their
cell phone numbers and wait until more blood was needed. The Guardian observed that wads of cash
and piles of donated food and water are being driven into Sichuan not only by army vehicles, but by
private or company-owned cars “adorned with red banners proclaiming the names of the donor
company or work unit.” The LA Times reported that although the government “has at times warned
do-gooders to stay clear and let the army and police do their jobs,” Chinese individuals and businesses
have continued to play an active role in relief efforts. “The outpouring of help from the people and the
speed with which many groups became involved underscored a fundamental shift in recent years as
more individuals and companies take the initiative, eroding the traditional government-led approach,”
comments the Times (5/15). In a particularly vivid example of citizen activism, this Wednesday a
group of eighteen mountaineers from Beijing, among them doctors and business owners, flew to a
quake-stricken country to rescue victims by putting their survival skills into practice, thus following in
the footsteps of the late-Qing literati who traveled to northern provinces to distribute relief (China
Daily, 5/15).
Chinese philanthropists leapt into action in the 1870s because by that point the beleaguered late-Qing
government no longer had the resources to carry out the type of massive relief campaign that
Confucian rhetoric and eighteenth-century precedent demanded. The current PRC state, in contrast, is
a strong state that thus far has proved to be quite capable of conducting a highly effective relief effort.
The degree of initiative displayed by non-state actors during this crisis, however, demonstrates that
the state no longer fully controls—and perhaps no longer feels a need to fully control—individual and
company-sponsored relief efforts. The late-Qing government reluctantly allowed foreign relief
workers—many of them Anglo-American missionaries—and Jiangnan philanthropists to distribute relief
in famine areas because by the 1870s it was simply too weak to deal with a major crisis by itself. The
present Chinese government, on the contrary, appears to be accepting foreign rescue teams and
private initiative from a position of relative strength. The assistance of Japanese relief workers or
Chinese citizens is no longer viewed primarily as a threat to an insecure state, but as a way to
improve ties with neighbors and further unify the nation.
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